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Cooperative oligopoly games: a probabilistic
approach
Paraskevas Lekeas∗ Giorgos Stamatopoulos†
Abstract
We analyze the core of a cooperative Cournot game. We assume that
when contemplating a deviation, the members of a coalition assign
positive probability over all possible coalition structures that the non-
members can form. We show that when the number of firms in the
market is sufficiently large then the core of the underlying cooperative
game is non-empty. Moreover, we show that the core of our game is a
subset of the γ core.
Keywords: Cooperative game with externalities; Cournot market; core
bounded rationality
1 Introduction
The issue of cooperation among firms in oligopolistic markets constantly attracts
the interest of economists. Among other avenues, economists analyze cooperation
in the market by examining the non-emptiness of the core of an appropriately
defined cooperative game. The core consists of all these allocations of total market
profits that cannot be blocked by any coalition of firms. When the members of
a coalition contemplate to block (or not) an allocation they need to calculate the
worth of their coalition. In a market environment such a calculation is not a trivial
task, though, as the coalition’s worth depends on how the non-members would act.
Namely, it depends on the coalition structure that the outsiders will form.
Different beliefs about the reaction of the outsiders lead to different notions
of core. The α and β cores (Aumann 1959) are based on min-max behavior on
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behalf of the non-members; the γ core (Chander and Tulkens 1997) is based on
the assumption that outsiders play individual best replies to the deviant coalition.
Various authors applied these core notions to the study of oligopolistic markets.
Rajan (1989) used the concept of γ core and showed that it is non-empty for a
market with 4 firms. Currarini and Marini (1998) built a refinement of the γ core
by assuming that the deviant coalition acts as a Stackelberg leader in the product
market. Zhao (1999) showed that the α and β cores of oligopolistic markets are
non-empty.
The seminal works of Bloch (1996) and Ray & Vohra (1999) go one step
further, as in their approaches the reactions of the outsiders –and the resulting
coalition structures– are deduced via equilibrium arguments. However, Sandholm
et.al (1999) showed that for an n-player game the number of different coalition
structures is O(nn) and ω(n
n
2 ). Hence computing which coalition structure the
outsiders form is, in general, a particularly difficult task (in fact the problem is
NP -complete).
The last result gives the motivation of the current paper. We analyze the core of
a Cournot oligopoly assuming that no group of firms has the computational ability
to accurately deduce the coalition structure that other firms will form. Instead,
when a coalition contemplates a deviation from the grand coalition it assumes
that all possible partitions of the outsiders can arise with positive probability. As
a first step, we assume that coalition structures are all equiprobable. By imposing
a uniform distribution over outsiders’ reactions, the current paper can be seen as
offering a boundedly rational approach to the literature of cooperative games with
externalities.
We derive the worth function of any coalition using the above scenario and we
examine the core of the corresponding game. We focus in a market with linear
demand and cost functions and product homogeneity. Our main result says that
when the number of firms is sufficiently large then no coalition has incentive to
break full cooperation; hence the core is non-empty. We also examine the relation
of our core with the γ core and we show that the former core is a subset of the
latter.
In what follows, we present the model in section 2 and in section 3 we present
our results. Section 4 provides concluding remarks.
2 Model
We consider a market with the set N = {1, 2, ..., n} of firms. Firms produce a
homogeneous product facing the inverse demand function P = max{a − Q, 0}
where P is the market price, Q = q1+ q2+ ...+ qn is the market quantity, ql is the
quantity of firm l, l = 1, 2, ..., n and a > 0. Firm l produces with the cost function
C(ql) = cql, l = 1, 2, ..., n, where c < a.
Let S ⊆ N denote a coalition with |S| = s firms and let N/S denote the com-
plementary set of S. The value (worth) of S is the sum of its members’ profits. In
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order to compute this value, the members of S need to predict how the members of
N/S partition themselves into coalitions. The set N/S can partition into disjoint
subsets in Bn−s possible ways, where Bn−s is Bell’s (n−s)
th number (Bell (1934)).
The Bn−s different partitions define Bn−s different coalition structures that coali-
tion S might face in the market. In this paper we incorporate the assumption
of bounded computational abilities of agents with regard to which structure will
form. One way to do this is by assuming that the members of coalition S treat all
structures as equiprobable, with probability 1
Bn−s
.
Let j denote a coalition structure with j members (coalitions), j = 1, 2, ..., n−s.
Observe that all coalition structures with j members induce the same profit for S
(as firms are symmetric). The number of coalition structures with j members is
kj , where kj is given by the coefficients of the Bell polynomials Bn−s,j (the Stirling
numbers of the second kind) which give the number of ways to partition a set of
n− s objects into j groups:
kj =
{
n− s
j
}
=
1
j!
j∑
i=0
(−1)i
(
j
i
)
(j − i)n−s (1)
What matters for S is the number of coalitions it faces in the market (if two
coalition structures have the same number of firms they induce the same profit for
S). So define the function
fn,s(j) =
kj
Bn−s
, j = 1, 2, ..., n − s (2)
which is the probability that a coalition S with s members assigns to coalition
structures with j coalitions, j = 1, 2, ..., n− s. With a slight abuse of notation, let
qji denote the quantity that coalition i chooses, i = 1, 2, ..., j, under structure j.
Let also qs denote the quantity of coalition S. The profit function that coalition
S faces is then given by
pi(S) =
n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)(a − qs −
j∑
i=1
qji − c)qs (3)
Moreover, from the perspective of coalition S, the profit function of coalition i
within structure j is
piji = (a− qs −
j∑
i=1
qji − c)q
j
i , i = 1, 2, ..., j, j = 1, 2, ..., n − s
Hence the maximization problems to solve for are
maxqspi(S)
max
q
j
i
piji , i = 1, 2, ..., j, j = 1, 2, ..., n − s
3
By symmetry, the solution of the above problems will involve qj1 = q
j
2 = ... = q
j
j ≡
qj, j = 1, 2, ..., n − s. Define
Ffn,s =
n−s∑
j=0
j · fn,s(j)
j + 1
(4)
Then it is easy to show that
qs =
1− Ffn,s
2− Ffn,s
(a− c) (5)
and for j = 1, 2, ..., n − s,
qji = q
j =
a− c
(j + 1)(2 − Ffn,s)
, i = 1, 2, ..., j (6)
Using (5),(6) and (1) in (3), we obtain v(S) as1
v(S) =
(α− c)2
Bn−s
1− Ffn,s
(2− Ffn,s)
2
n−s∑
j=0
{n−s
j
}
j + 1
(7)
Hence our game is the pair (N, v) where v is defined by (7).
3 Properties of the game
In this section we derive some important properties of the game (N, v).
Lemma 1 Let vn(s) denote the value for coalition S 6= ∅ with |S| = s in a game
with n players. For every positive integer k we have that vn(s) = vn+k(s+ k).
Proof. vn(s) = (α−c)
2
Bn−s
·
1−Ffn,s
(2−Ffn,s )
2 ·
n−s∑
j=0
{n−sj }
j+1 =
= (α−c)
2
B(n+k)−(s+k)
·
1−Ffn,s
(2−Ffn,s )
2 ·
(n+k)−(s+k)∑
j=0
{(n+k)−(s+k)j }
j+1 = v
n+k(s+ k)
because from (4) Ffn+k,s+k = Ffn,s .
An almost immediate implication of Lemma 1 is the monotonicity of v(S) in |S| =
s.
Lemma 2 For every S with |S| = s ≤ n, vn(S) is strictly increasing in s.
1Normally, we should sum from j = 1 up to n − s but for convenience we start from
j = 0 with the understanding that fn,s(0) = 0.
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Proof. We will use induction on the number of players n. For the base case, n = 2,
we have to prove that v2(2) > v2(1) > v2(0). We have that v2(2) =
(
a−c
2
)2
>(
a−c
3
)2
= v2(1) > 0 = v2(0), so we have the base case. Assume for the induction
hypothesis that in a game with n players and for an arbitrary s, 1 < s ≤ n
we have that vn(s) > vn(s − 1). We will prove that vn+1(s) > vn+1(s − 1).
But this is an immediate result of lemma 1 and the induction hypothesis since
vn+1(s) = vn(s− 1) > vn(s − 2) = vn+1(s− 1).
We are now ready to state and prove the main result of this section.
Proposition 1. The game (N, v) has non-empty core for all n ≥ 11.
Proof. Since firms are identical, we can use Lemma 1 of Rajan (1989), according
to which the core of a game is non empty if and only if for all S : |S| = s ≤ n
v(n)
n
≥
v(s)
s
(8)
It is easy to verify that inequality (8) does not hold for 3 ≤ n ≤ 10, so for these
values of n the core is empty.2 We will prove the rest of the proposition using
induction on n, n ≥ 11.
Base: Table 1 in the Appendix establishes the base case (n = 11).
Induction hypothesis: For all S : |S| = s ≤ n, v
n(n)
n
≥ v
n(s)
s
.
Induction step: We will show that for all S : |S| = s ≤ n+ 1,
vn+1(n+ 1)
n+ 1
≥
vn+1(s)
s
By Lemma 1 we have that vn+1(s) = vn+1((s − 1) + 1) = vn(s − 1) and also that
vn+1(n+ 1) = vn(n). So we have to show that
vn(n)
n+ 1
≥
vn(s− 1)
s
(9)
From the Induction hypothesis we have
vn(n) ≥
n
s− 1
vn(s− 1)
and thus
(s− 1)vn(n) ≥ nvn(s− 1) (10)
Using Lemma 2,
vn(n) > vn(s− 1) (11)
2For 3 ≤ n ≤ 10 and for all S with |S| = 1 it holds that vn(1) > v
n(n)
n
. See Table 2 in
the Appendix.
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Adding (10) and (11) gives svn(n) ≥ (n+1)vn(s−1) which implies that (9) holds.
So we have the proof for n+ 1 and thus the proposition.
Our result shows that for low values of n, the sign of vn(n)/n − vn(S)/s can be
negative for some s, whereas for large n the sign is always positive. To see why
we need large n for core non-emptiness, we note that as n increases, both vn(n)/n
and vn(S)/s decrease. However, the second term decreases faster than the first.
Hence there would be an n above which the difference vn(n)/n−vn(S)/s eventually
becomes positive for all s.
3.1 Relation with the γ core
Let us now analyze the relation of our core with the γ core. Under the latter notion,
the members of a deviant coalition believe that the outsiders play individual best
replies. Below we show that the γ core is non-empty for our market and that our
core is a subset of the γ core. Let vγ(S) denote the worth function of S under the
scenario of γ-behavior of players. The pair (N, vγ) will denote the game under the
latter scenario; finally Cγ will denote the core of (N, vγ) and Cf the core of our
game.
Remark 1 Cγ 6= ∅
Proof. It is straightforward to show that vγ(S) =
(a− c)2
(2 + n− s)2
and that vγ(N) =
(a− c)2
4
.
Hence
vγ(N)
n
≥
vγ(S)
s
if and only if sn2 + (4s − 4 − 2s2)n + s(4 + s2 − 4s) ≥ 0
which holds. Hence the γ core is non-empty.
Lemma 3 Cf ⊂ Cγ
Proof. By Proposition 1, if n ∈ {3, 4, · · · , 10}, we have Cf = ∅ ⊂ Cγ . If n ≥ 11,
then Cf 6= ∅. In this case, it suffices to show that v(S) > vγ(S). To this end, let
us give a useful representation of v(S). The representation is based on harmonic
numbers. Recall that the k-th harmonic number is defined as
hk = 1 +
1
2
+
1
3
+ · · ·+
1
k
=
k−1∑
j=0
1
1 + j
Let us now define
hkf =
k−1∑
j=0
f(j)
1 + j
as the k-th probabilistic harmonic number where f(.) is a probability distribution
on {0, 1, 2, · · · , k}. To make a connection between the above concept and our game,
notice that we can write (7) as
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v(S) = (a− c)2
1− Ffn,s
(2− Ffn,s)
2
hn−s+1fn,s (12)
where
hn−s+1fn,s =
n−s∑
j=0
fn,s(j)
1 + j
Notice next that
Ffn,s =
n−s∑
j=0
j · fn,s(j)
j + 1
=
n−s∑
j=0
[1−
1
j + 1
]fn,s(j) = 1−
n−s∑
j=0
fn,s(j)
j + 1
Hence
Ffn,s = 1− h
n−s+1
fn,s
(13)
Then combining (12) and (13) we get
v(S) =
(hn−s+1fn,s )
2
(1 + hn−s+1fn,s )
2
(a− c)2 (14)
A similar representation can be given for vγ(S) as well. Let h
n−s+1
γ denote the
probabilistic harmonic number associated with (N, vγ). Then
hn−s+1γ =
1
n− s+ 1
and thus
vγ(S) =
(hn−s+1γ )
2
(1 + hn−s+1γ )2
(a− c)2
Hence in order to show that v(S) > vγ(S) it suffices to show that h
n−s+1
f > h
n−s+1
γ .
The last inequality always holds as hn−s+1f is a weighted average of the list of
numbers (1, 12 ,
1
3 , ...,
1
n−s+1) all of which are no less than h
n−s+1
γ .
The γ core is based on the worst scenario for the members of the deviant coali-
tion S: all outsiders in N/S remain separate entities. Under our scenario, the
singleton coalition structure is one only of the structures that the members of S
take into account. Other, more favorable structures, occur with positive probabil-
ity. Hence, under our framework, deviations from the grand coalition are ”easier”,
which explains the relation between the two cores.
Let us conclude this section noticing that representations of the form (14) hold
for any probability distribution that a coalition assigns over the set of coalition
structures. Consider the distributions gn,s(j) and zn,s(j). Let (N, vg) and (N, vz)
denote the corresponding games and let Cg and Cz denote the cores of the two
games. We have the following
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Corollary 1 Consider two probability distributions gn,s(j) and zn,s(j) such that
hn−s+1gn,s > h
n−s+1
zn,s , for all s. If Cg 6= ∅ then Cz 6= ∅ as well.
Proof. Since hn−s+1gn,s > h
n−s+1
zn,s then vg(S) > vz(S). Let x ∈ Cg. Then
∑
i∈S
xi ≥
vg(S) > vz(S) for any S. Hence x ∈ Cz and Cz 6= ∅.
Corollary 1 is useful in allowing for a operational comparison of the cores of two
(or more) different games. If we know that the core of one of the two games is
non-empty, Corollary 1 gives us a (convenient) sufficient condition for the non-
emptiness of the core of the other: we simply need to compare two numbers, i.e.,
the probabilistic harmonic numbers induced by the corresponding distributions.
4 Conclusions
This paper has incorporated elements of bounded rationality into the study of
cooperative oligopoly games with externalities. When a coalition contemplates to
not cooperate with the rest of the players it assumes that all possible coalition
structures can form with positive probability. Whenever the number of firms is
sufficiently large, then the core of the game is non-empty. Furthermore, it is a
subset of the γ core.
We assumed that all coalition structures occur according to the probability
distribution fn,s. Other probability schemes can produce core non-emptiness as
well. Consider distributions under which the probabilities assigned to coalition
structures with relatively many coalitions are higher compared to fn,s. Clearly,
under these distributions, the core will be non-empty more often, i.e., for more
values of n. The reason is that these distributions penalize the structures that are
more favorable for a deviant coalition (i.e, structures with few coalitions) and give
more weight to less favorable structure (i.e., structures with many coalitions).
Finally, let us mention a few extensions of the current work. The analysis of
oligopolistic markets with more general demand and cost functions and/or other
modes of competition (e.g., product differentiation, price competition) are natu-
ral future directions. Further, the application of the current framework to other
economic environments (e.g, environmental agreements, etc.) or to abstract coop-
erative games with externalities is of special interest.
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Appendix
s v(s)
(a−c)2
1 0.0226
2 0.0252
3 0.0285
4 0.0326
5 0.0378
6 0.0446
7 0.0539
8 0.0672
9 0.0865
10 0.1111
11 0.25
Table 1: values v(s) of coalition S : |S| = s in a game with n = 11 players.
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n v({i})
(a−c)2
3 0.0865
4 0.0672
5 0.0539
6 0.0446
7 0.0378
8 0.0326
9 0.0285
10 0.0252
Table 2: values v({i}), n ∈ {3, 4, · · · , 10}
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